Beijing has strongly condemned joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran, targeting its leadership and infrastructure. As the main buyer of Iranian oil and strategic partner, China must now secure its own energy supplies without being drawn into a regional escalation.

First modification: 03/04/2026 - 08:11 Last modification: 03/04/2026 - 09:26

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned the attacks on Sunday, calling the "blatant assassination of a sovereign leader" and attempts to bring about regime change "unacceptable," and urged an immediate ceasefire and resumption of negotiations to avoid a broader regional war.

China has long been a key ally of Iran, buying about 90% of its exported oil and providing economic and technological support.

Recent attacks by the US and Israel, which disrupted strategic facilities and killed senior leaders including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, put Beijing in a delicate position: avoiding involvement in the regional conflict while its energy security is at stake.

Shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz, through which almost half of the oil China imports from the Gulf passes, have been disrupted, highlighting the vulnerability of its energy imports.

Iran is also a difficult partner to replace, especially due to discounts on oil derived from international sanctions.

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The offensive also exposes the limits of Chinese influence in the region. Although Beijing can offer economic and diplomatic support, it cannot guarantee military protection to its allies, forcing it to carefully calibrate its response to avoid a direct confrontation with Washington.

According to Theo Nencini, a researcher at the ChinaMed Project and a specialist in Iran-China relations, approximately 12% to 15% of China's oil supply comes from Iran, equivalent to around 1.5 million barrels per day from 2023.

Most of this oil is loaded on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, and tankers pass through the Strait of Hormuz before heading to Southeast Asia, where ship-to-ship transfers are often made to conceal the origin of the crude. The oil is then often re-labelled as coming from Malaysia, Oman or the United Arab Emirates before reaching China, especially to independent refineries in Shandong province.

These refineries, known as "teapots," are less vulnerable to US sanctions because they have no assets in the United States and are adapted to process Iranian crude.

To offset the risks of sanctions, Iran offers discounts of between 6% and 10%, which has significantly reduced its potential revenue.

China currently faces no immediate risk of shortages, as it has between 40 and 45 million barrels stored in floating reserves. However, the real vulnerable point remains the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 45% of its oil imports passes.

China also imports Iranian petrochemicals, such as methanol, used in the production of plastics and industrial chemicals, although in smaller volumes than oil.

China's stance against the attacks is based on its doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, which rejects any military intervention or attempt at regime change in another country. For this reason, Beijing usually issues strong diplomatic condemnations, but avoids direct involvement in the conflict.

In the Middle East, China has two main priorities: guaranteeing energy security, especially the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and maintaining regional stability, due to the risk of a resurgence of extremist movements that could affect Xinjiang, Central Asia or Pakistan, where Chinese citizens have been the target of attacks in the past.

Should Iran face an existential threat, it could respond asymmetrically or through regional allies, although these scenarios remain difficult to foresee.

Although China and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2021, actual cooperation remains limited and fragmented. Despite announcements of $400 billion in Chinese investments, many projects have not fully materialized.

There are some concrete projects, such as railway modernization, port improvements and works in the Chabahar/Makran region. In the military sphere, China supplied anti-ship missiles and industrial technology to Iran between 1985 and 1997, but since 2010 verifiable cooperation has been limited.

Overall, the relationship between the two countries is pragmatic and tactical rather than strategic, focused on energy, selective infrastructure and limited military cooperation, as Beijing tries to avoid violating US sanctions or escalating tensions with Washington.

This article is an adaptation of its original in English

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